| H.M.S. Victoria & H.M.S. Camperdown _________________________________________________ |
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Introduction
H.M.S. VICTORIA DISASTER
On the afternoon of Thursday 22 June 1893, one of the worst disasters of the peacetime Victorian Navy took place.
That afternoon at 1531 on a calm & glistening Mediterranean Sea, as a result of a maneouver ordered by Admiral George Tryon; that
was technically impossible; a collision occurred between HMS Victoria & HMS Camperdown, leading to the Victoria sinking at 1544. The
loss of life in that short time was 22 officers & 336 men including Admiral Tryon.
Of her total complement, 29 Officers & 262 men were saved.
On Thurs June 22, the Mediterranean fleet weighed anchor & left Beruit en route to Tripoli, approx 40 miles to the northward. They
proceeded at an economical speed of approx 8 ½ knots, formed in a single line abreast. In command of this formidable fleet was Vice
Admiral George Tryon, an admiral greatly respected within the fleet, for his ability to manoeuvre ships in a fleet & an absolute
disciplinarian whom no one would dare question.
At 1420 Adm Tryon gave the signal for the fleet to form into “Columns of Divisions in Line Ahead” columns to be 6 cables apart – this
maneouver put the fleet into two columns as follows –
His flagship, HMS Victoria, lead the First or Starboard Division, followed by HMS Nile, Dreadnought, Inflexible, Collingwood, & Phaeton.
The 2nd or Port Division was led by Rear Admiral Hastings Markham, 2nd in command of the Fleet in HMS Camperdown, followed by
Edinburgh, Sans Pareil, Edgar,& Amphion. Also in attendance that fateful day were the cruisers HMS Barham & Fearless.
This was a standard well practiced Victorian Naval manoeuvre, & was in preparation to bring the fleet to anchor of Tripoli roadstead. As
it was Adm Tryon’s intention to bring the fleet into Tripoli from the northwards, he planned on steaming past Tripoli, then reverse the
direction of the fleet & approach the roadstead in the formation in which they would anchor.
There are various ways in which he could have accomplished this, & the one he choose would prove fateful.
At 1531 (some accounts say 1527 or 1534) he ordered the following two signals hoisted – “Second Division alter course in succession
16 points to STARBOARD” & “First Division alter course in succession 16 points to PORT”
This manoeuvre would cause the two columns to turn INWARDS towards each other in succession. The only problem with it was that
there was not enough water between the two columns to make this manoeuvre succeed without a collision taking place – there would
have had to be at least 12 cables between the two columns for it to be carried out successfully.
No one knows what went thru Adm Tryon’s mind that afternoon – he must have known that a collision would result, but he adamantly
refused to change the order even when prompted by his Navigating Commander via his Flag Captain. Admiral Markham from his bridge
in Camperdown, however, saw the error & hesitated in carrying it out & attempted to signal Adm Tryon to that effect. However Adm
Tryon was an impatient man & signalled Camperdown “what are you waiting for?” Adm Markham did not press his point & both columns
commenced their fateful turns.
From his bridge Adm Markham watched the ships approach each other & seeing that Victoria continued to turn (he thought she would
turn OUTSIDE the radius of the turn) ordered his Flag Captain to go full speed astern with the starboard propeller in order to decrease
Camperdown's circle of turning, then as he became aware that a collision would likely take place,, ordered full speed astern with both
props, but before the speed of the ship could be checked a collision took place. The stem of the Camperdown struck the Victoria on her
starboard bow& crashed into her almost to her centre line. Camperdown was equipped with a bow ram which was made for exactly this
situation, so the resulting damage was deep & fateful. When the ships began to part (& this took several minutes), Victoria began
flooding quickly & began to settle immediately by the head, in a short few minutes she heeled over to starboard turned bottom
upwards & sank.
Staff Commander Hawkins-Smith’s (the Navigating Commander on Victoria) watch stopped at exactly 1544 & 30 secs so it took approx
12 minutes for her to disappear beneath the Mediterranean. The sea was calm & glistening in th afternoon sunlight, & they were within
eyesight of anchoring position.
The loss of life was great for a couple reasons – Thursday afternoon was “make & mend” day in the Victorian Navy & many men were
below decks doing what they would normally do on M & M – writing letters, sleeping, etc etc. The engine room staff were all below & did
not muster on deck after the collision as many of the ship’s company did. It did not appear as if the Victoria would sink so quickly, it
was felt that she could be successfully beached before foundering, however this was not the case, & many officers & men were trapped
below decks when she took her final plunge. Many men were killed whilst in the water by the still turning propellers & falling debris from
the ship – many were able to swim away & were picked up in the lifeboats which were sent out by other ships immediately after the
collision.
There was a resulting court martial to try to determine what had happened & how it happened. All of the survivors were present for
this court martial. The ‘long & short of it’ was that Adm Tryon had erred in his estimation of the distance between the two fleets &
should not have carried out the manoeuvre.
In the Victorian Navy ceremonial “shows” by the fleet were an essential part of everyday life & the officers & men would have carried
with them on board all of their best kits & medals. When Victoria went down she carried all of this with her, thus every man lost his
complete kit & everything he came aboard with – the only thing he had left was what he was wearing when plucked out of the sea.
All ratings were reimbursed for their kit & bedding losses & in due course rec’d replacement medals for those entitled to them.
Petty Officer Aldridge was a senior PO at the time he was serving on Victoria – he was approaching the end of his service. He was
Captain of the Foremast on Victoria so if he was on deck on duty at the time of the manoeuvre he likely would have had a very good
view of the approaching Camperdown & the resulting collision – he might have even been part of the crew that attempted to get a
collision mat over the huge hole - how he escaped I don’t know, perhaps he jumped, perhaps he was thrown, perhaps he mustered
with the crew when they were called above decks, in any event he ended up in the water & survive he did & lived to receive his pension
2 years later.
No doubt he spoke of it many times afterwards.
On the afternoon of Thursday 22 June 1893, one of the worst disasters of the peacetime Victorian Navy took place.
That afternoon at 1531 on a calm & glistening Mediterranean Sea, as a result of a maneouver ordered by Admiral George Tryon; that
was technically impossible; a collision occurred between HMS Victoria & HMS Camperdown, leading to the Victoria sinking at 1544. The
loss of life in that short time was 22 officers & 336 men including Admiral Tryon.
Of her total complement, 29 Officers & 262 men were saved.
On Thurs June 22, the Mediterranean fleet weighed anchor & left Beruit en route to Tripoli, approx 40 miles to the northward. They
proceeded at an economical speed of approx 8 ½ knots, formed in a single line abreast. In command of this formidable fleet was Vice
Admiral George Tryon, an admiral greatly respected within the fleet, for his ability to manoeuvre ships in a fleet & an absolute
disciplinarian whom no one would dare question.
At 1420 Adm Tryon gave the signal for the fleet to form into “Columns of Divisions in Line Ahead” columns to be 6 cables apart – this
maneouver put the fleet into two columns as follows –
His flagship, HMS Victoria, lead the First or Starboard Division, followed by HMS Nile, Dreadnought, Inflexible, Collingwood, & Phaeton.
The 2nd or Port Division was led by Rear Admiral Hastings Markham, 2nd in command of the Fleet in HMS Camperdown, followed by
Edinburgh, Sans Pareil, Edgar,& Amphion. Also in attendance that fateful day were the cruisers HMS Barham & Fearless.
This was a standard well practiced Victorian Naval manoeuvre, & was in preparation to bring the fleet to anchor of Tripoli roadstead. As
it was Adm Tryon’s intention to bring the fleet into Tripoli from the northwards, he planned on steaming past Tripoli, then reverse the
direction of the fleet & approach the roadstead in the formation in which they would anchor.
There are various ways in which he could have accomplished this, & the one he choose would prove fateful.
At 1531 (some accounts say 1527 or 1534) he ordered the following two signals hoisted – “Second Division alter course in succession
16 points to STARBOARD” & “First Division alter course in succession 16 points to PORT”
This manoeuvre would cause the two columns to turn INWARDS towards each other in succession. The only problem with it was that
there was not enough water between the two columns to make this manoeuvre succeed without a collision taking place – there would
have had to be at least 12 cables between the two columns for it to be carried out successfully.
No one knows what went thru Adm Tryon’s mind that afternoon – he must have known that a collision would result, but he adamantly
refused to change the order even when prompted by his Navigating Commander via his Flag Captain. Admiral Markham from his bridge
in Camperdown, however, saw the error & hesitated in carrying it out & attempted to signal Adm Tryon to that effect. However Adm
Tryon was an impatient man & signalled Camperdown “what are you waiting for?” Adm Markham did not press his point & both columns
commenced their fateful turns.
From his bridge Adm Markham watched the ships approach each other & seeing that Victoria continued to turn (he thought she would
turn OUTSIDE the radius of the turn) ordered his Flag Captain to go full speed astern with the starboard propeller in order to decrease
Camperdown's circle of turning, then as he became aware that a collision would likely take place,, ordered full speed astern with both
props, but before the speed of the ship could be checked a collision took place. The stem of the Camperdown struck the Victoria on her
starboard bow& crashed into her almost to her centre line. Camperdown was equipped with a bow ram which was made for exactly this
situation, so the resulting damage was deep & fateful. When the ships began to part (& this took several minutes), Victoria began
flooding quickly & began to settle immediately by the head, in a short few minutes she heeled over to starboard turned bottom
upwards & sank.
Staff Commander Hawkins-Smith’s (the Navigating Commander on Victoria) watch stopped at exactly 1544 & 30 secs so it took approx
12 minutes for her to disappear beneath the Mediterranean. The sea was calm & glistening in th afternoon sunlight, & they were within
eyesight of anchoring position.
The loss of life was great for a couple reasons – Thursday afternoon was “make & mend” day in the Victorian Navy & many men were
below decks doing what they would normally do on M & M – writing letters, sleeping, etc etc. The engine room staff were all below & did
not muster on deck after the collision as many of the ship’s company did. It did not appear as if the Victoria would sink so quickly, it
was felt that she could be successfully beached before foundering, however this was not the case, & many officers & men were trapped
below decks when she took her final plunge. Many men were killed whilst in the water by the still turning propellers & falling debris from
the ship – many were able to swim away & were picked up in the lifeboats which were sent out by other ships immediately after the
collision.
There was a resulting court martial to try to determine what had happened & how it happened. All of the survivors were present for
this court martial. The ‘long & short of it’ was that Adm Tryon had erred in his estimation of the distance between the two fleets &
should not have carried out the manoeuvre.
In the Victorian Navy ceremonial “shows” by the fleet were an essential part of everyday life & the officers & men would have carried
with them on board all of their best kits & medals. When Victoria went down she carried all of this with her, thus every man lost his
complete kit & everything he came aboard with – the only thing he had left was what he was wearing when plucked out of the sea.
All ratings were reimbursed for their kit & bedding losses & in due course rec’d replacement medals for those entitled to them.
Petty Officer Aldridge was a senior PO at the time he was serving on Victoria – he was approaching the end of his service. He was
Captain of the Foremast on Victoria so if he was on deck on duty at the time of the manoeuvre he likely would have had a very good
view of the approaching Camperdown & the resulting collision – he might have even been part of the crew that attempted to get a
collision mat over the huge hole - how he escaped I don’t know, perhaps he jumped, perhaps he was thrown, perhaps he mustered
with the crew when they were called above decks, in any event he ended up in the water & survive he did & lived to receive his pension
2 years later.
No doubt he spoke of it many times afterwards.
For those that have little conception of what I am talking about or find it
hard to visualize, here is an illustration showing some scenarios -
Victoria's column is in black, & Markhams column is in white.
Top to Bottom:
1. The "impossible" manoeuver Tryon was supposed to have attempted.
2. What Adm Markham thought was going to take place
3. What Tryon might have intended to take place
4. What actually took place that afternoon.
hard to visualize, here is an illustration showing some scenarios -
Victoria's column is in black, & Markhams column is in white.
Top to Bottom:
1. The "impossible" manoeuver Tryon was supposed to have attempted.
2. What Adm Markham thought was going to take place
3. What Tryon might have intended to take place
4. What actually took place that afternoon.
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A photo of Victoria foundering - taken from "The
Illustrated London News" July 8, 1893.
Illustrated London News" July 8, 1893.
Another view of the foundering - these views were drawn
by an eyewitness aboard HMS Inflexible... engraved &
published in the "Graphic" 3 weeks after the disaster....
by an eyewitness aboard HMS Inflexible... engraved &
published in the "Graphic" 3 weeks after the disaster....
Here is another drawing published in "The Graphic" of the
aftermath of the disaster - Victoria has sunk & the lifeboats
are attempting to pick up survivors in the churning sea.
On the right is HMS Camperdown, & the view of her is not
accurate - her bows were head down after the collision - she
suffered considerable bow damage but did not founder.
This is an actual photograph taken at the time of the sinking
by the Staff Surgeon of HMS Collingwood. It has been
published in several biographies & books of the period.
Victoria is just about to slip under on the right, & on the left is
HMS Nile the ship that was next to her in line.
by the Staff Surgeon of HMS Collingwood. It has been
published in several biographies & books of the period.
Victoria is just about to slip under on the right, & on the left is
HMS Nile the ship that was next to her in line.
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